University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

1992

Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence
Roger C. Park
UC Hastings College of the Law, parkr@uchastings.edu

Margaret Bull Kovera
Steven D. Penrod

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Roger C. Park, Margaret Bull Kovera, and Steven D. Penrod, Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703
(1992).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/606

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Park

Roger

Author:

Roger C. Park

Source:

Minnesota Law Review

Citation:

76 Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1992).

Title:

Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence

Originally published in MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission
from MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW and University of Minnesota Law School.

Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness
and Hearsay Evidence
Margaret Bull Kovera,* Roger C. Park,**
and Steven D. Penrod***
The study presented in this Article examines mock jurors'

ability to differentiate between good and poor hearsay testimony. It suggests that mock jurors are more skeptical of hearsay testimony than eyewitness testimony. In addition, subjects

indicated more sensitivity to the varying quality and accuracy
of testimony from hearsay witnesses than eyewitnesses. This
Article presents the study's findings and reviews its implications for hearsay reform.
I. THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE RULE
AGAINST HEARSAY
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."'- Unless one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule applies, hearsay testimony is inadmissible at trial.
When hearsay is received, the adverse party cannot explore
defects in the out-of-court declarant's memory, perception, narration, or sincerity. The principal reason for excluding hearsay
is the fear that the jury will be incapable of accurately evaluating the declarant's credibility.2 Some commentators also have
expressed concern about other effects, including the danger of
in-court witnesses fabricating testimony.3
*
**
***

Ph.D. candidate, social psychology, University of Minnesota.
Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

1. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
2. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary EmpiricalEnquiry Concerning the Prohibitionof Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 65, 70-72 (1991) (explaining that
jurors' inability "to analyze second hand information" is one of the "fundamental props of the hearsay rule").
3. For a full catalog of possible reasons for excluding hearsay, see Roger
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A number of legal commentators have urged lawmakers to
liberalize the rule against hearsay, or at least substantially reduce its exclusionary effect. Some critics have urged outright
abolition of the hearsay doctrine. 4 Others believe that courts
should admit hearsay in civil cases if the party producing the
evidence gives notice to the opponent. 5 Still others suggest that
courts admit hearsay upon a discretionary finding by the trial
judge that it is trustworthy.6 American jurisdictions have been
slow to accept these reforms but a number of Commonwealth
jurisdictions have liberalized their hearsay rules along these
7
lines.
Proponents of reform argue "that it is better to admit
flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the opponent a
chance to expose its defects, than to take the chance of a miscarriage of justice because the trier is deprived of information." Critics have argued further that since jurors routinely
rely on hearsay testimony in their everyday lives, they have
sufficient practice judging such evidence. 9 Whether jurors are
capable of accurately judging the validity of hearsay evidence is
an empirical question. This study suggests that jurors are, in
fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony.
II. JURORS' PERCEPTIONS OF WITNESS TESTIMONY
AND CREDIBILITY
There have been relatively few empirical investigations of
jurors' evaluations of hearsay witnesses and their testimony. In
a study conducted by Professors Landsman and Rakos, mock
jurors read a trial transcript which included both hearsay and
non-hearsay evidence.' 0 The researchers systematically varied
C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to HearsayReform, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 51,

55-67 (1987).
4. See Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U.

Prrr. L. REV.609 (1974).
5. See Park, supra note 3, at 112-14, 119-22 (discussing notice based proposals for admitting hearsay in civil contexts).

6. See, e.g., Irving Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32
S.C. L. REV. 281, 293 (1980) (arguing that admission of hearsay could follow a
judicial determination of trustworthiness); see also Charles T. McCormick,
Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 218, 219 (1956) (same).
7. See Colin Tapper, Presentation at the Hearsay Reform Conference
(Sept. 6, 1991) (tracing hearsay reform in England and Wales from 1938 to the
present and discussing new schemes of reform in South Africa and Scotland).
8. Park, supra note 3, at 52.
9. Id, at 54.
10. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 73.
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the strength of the hearsay testimony and the strength of the
remaining evidence using different versions of a trial transcript.1' The subjects reported that strong or moderate hearsay
testimony was more important to their decisions than weak
hearsay testimony or innocuous statements, but they were no
more likely to convict a defendant against whom strong hearsay
testimony had been introduced than one against whom no hearsay evidence had been introduced.12 The authors suggested
that the lack of influence that hearsay evidence has on verdicts
may be the result of jurors' skepticism regarding hearsay
testimony.13
Miene, Park, Borgida, and Anderson conducted another
study that examined jurors' perceptions of hearsay testimony. 14
The study used a videotaped trial simulation to present subjects
with either circumstantial evidence, hearsay testimony and circumstantial evidence, eyewitness evidence and circumstantial
evidence, or a combination of all available evidence. The hearsay witnesses and the eyewitnesses provided virtually identical
factual evidence. Nonetheless, jurors were less likely to convict
the defendant when they heard hearsay testimony than when
they heard eyewitness testimony.1 5 Mock jurors also reported
that they considered eyewitness testimony more influential and
more reliable than the testimony provided by the hearsay witness.'6 Furthermore, subjects rarely found the hearsay evidence determinative of the trial's outcome.1 7 On the basis of
these findings, the authors concluded that jurors do not rely
heavily on hearsay testimony. In fact, it appeared that mock jurors in their study undervalued hearsay testimony.
Although little research has focused on the effects of hearsay testimony on juror decision making, there is a wealth of in11. I.

12. Id- at 75-76.
13. I& at 76. Landsman and Rakos, however, did not compare the subject's evaluations of hearsay testimony and the other evidence to determine
whether a difference in evaluations was statistically significant.
14. Peter Miene et al., The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, Presented at

the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, Massachusetts (Aug. 1990) in CURRENT IssuEs IN INDIviDuAL AND GROUP DECIsION-MAKING REsEARCH (N. John Castellan ed., forthcoming 1992).
15. Id- Overall, the conviction rates were not significantly different under
the circumstantial and hearsay conditions, nor were the rates different between the eyewitness and all evidence conditions.

16. Id17. Id In open-ended responses to a question asking the subjects for the
most important pieces of evidence presented at trial, the hearsay witness's testimony was rarely mentioned.
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formation on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness testimony. Most
psycholegal research on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness testimony has found that jurors are insensitive to factors that affect
the accuracy of eyewitnesses' memories.' 8 A study by Cutler,
18. See, e.g., Steven G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus
Specific Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock JurorJudgment, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 215 (1986); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-zjror
Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of Metamemory Hypotheses, 16
J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOL. 447 (1986) [hereinafter Lindsay et al., Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses] (illustrating that neither lighting conditions at the
time of a criminal incident nor the length of the perpetrator's exposure to a
witness significantly influenced jurors' evaluation of an eyewitness); Gary L.
Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications
for Triers of Fact,66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981) (suggesting that, because
eyewitness testimony is tractable-subject to "briefing" etc.-confidence in a
false memory can be enhanced and is therefore not an indicator of witness accuracy); Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for PeripheralDetail
Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682 (1981) [hereinafter Wells &
Leippe, Memory for PeripheralDetail] (suggesting that jurors place too great
a weight on eyewitnesses' memories of peripheral detail); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Fjffects of Expert PsychologicalAdvice on Human Performancein Judging the
Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275 (1980) [hereinafter Wells et al., Effects of Expert PsychologicalAdvice] (reviewing recent research regarding human performance in judging eyewitness testimony and

concluding that jurors are overly willing to believe in the accuracy of eyewitness testimony); Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. & Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of
Eyewitness Confidence in JurorPerceptionsof Credibility, 16 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 387 (1986) (discussing, on the issue of how well jurors interpret eye-

witness testimony, the different assumptions made by lay people and the judicial system compared to those by psychological researchers).
Research methodologies in this area have varied. Some researchers have
used questionnaire studies which assessed the potential jurors' knowledge regarding factors which affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (often using
a multiple-choice format). See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Do JurorsShare a Common UnderstandingConcerningEyewitness Behavior?, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982) (concluding that there is no common
understanding of variables which affect eyewitness testimony); A. Daniel
Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Accuracy of Memory of Male and Female Eyewitness to CriminalAssault and Rape, 2 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SoCIETY 89
(1983) (determining that attitudes towards rape do not lead to more reliable
identification by eyewitnesses in a simulated sexual assault context). In other
studies, researchers asked subjects to predict accuracy rates of eyewitnesses in
experiments after the witnessing conditions were described to the subject. See,
e.g., Michael R. Leippe et al., Crime Seriousness as a Determinate ofAccuracy
in Eyewitness IdentifcationAccuracy, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 345 (1978) (illustrating that eyewitness accuracy is a function of the perceived seriousness
of an event). Some researchers have employed mock jury studies in which
subjects tried a case which included eyewitness testimony. See Brian L. Cutler
et al., Juror Decisionmaking in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 41 (1988) (concluding that lay people are insensitive to factors
that influence eyewitness testimony); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?,66 J. AP-
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Penrod, and Stuve found that actual jurors, as well as mock jurors, have difficulty differentiating between good eyewitness
testimony and poor eyewitness testimony. 19 Overall, these
studies unequivocally demonstrate that jurors are not sensitive
to factors which reduce the probative value of eyewitness testimony, such as retention interval, disguise of a robber, lineup instructions, and lineup construction. Therefore, jurors'
judgments about eyewitness accuracy are often erroneous.
Given that jurors' cannot differentiate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses, is there any reason to believe that jurors
are capable of gauging the accuracy of hearsay witnesses? If jurors cannot judge the accuracy of a hearsay witness's description of an event, are jurors able to assign the appropriate
weight to hearsay evidence? Finally, even if jurors can differentiate between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony,
will the introduction of hearsay evidence decrease jurors' satisfaction with the judicial process? The study in this Article attempts to address these questions by examining jurors'
perceptions of the testimony offered by eyewitnesses and hearsay witnesses to a single event.
III.

METHOD

A. SUBJECTS

One-hundred sixty-two undergraduates from the University of Minnesota participated in this study. These participants
received extra credit in their introductory psychology course or
four dollars compensation.
B.

PROCEDURE

Subjects acted as jurors at a professional misconduct hearing. Researchers told the subjects that their task was to determine whether the attorney under investigation was guilty of
manufacturing a defense for his client. Participants read a description of the charges which had been brought against the attorney. The charge alleged that Paul Stewart, an attorney, had
been representing Tom Mannion, a criminal defendant charged
with murder. Researchers further explained that although it is
ethical for an attorney to defend a client, even if the attorney
PLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981) (finding a small relationship between witness accu-

racy and witness confidence leading to jurors placing too much weight on
witness accuracy when confidence is high).
19. See Brian L. Cutler, et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1990).
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does not believe in the innocence of the client, it is unethical
for the attorney to offer false evidence or otherwise urge his
client to fabricate a defense.
All subjects watched the videotaped testimony of a law
clerk who was an eyewitness to Stewart's alleged misconduct.
The law clerk was present during two meetings between Stewart and Mannion in which they discussed Mannion's defense.
Some subjects also watched the testimony of a hearsay witness
who reported the substance of her conversation with a second
law clerk who was also present at the two meetings.
Three graduate students in psychology played the role of
the law clerk eyewitness to the two meetings. They viewed a
portion of the film Anatomy of a Murder. The film portrayed
two meetings between an attorney and his client. The eyewitnesses were interviewed about the meetings after varying intervals, in some cases one day, in others two days or one week.
The researchers videotaped the eyewitnesses as they answered
questions about what they had witnessed. Researchers first
asked the eyewitnesses to describe everything they
remembered from the meetings. The researchers then asked
eyewitnesses specific questions about general topics that were
discussed during the meetings. Finally, the interrogators asked
the eyewitnesses specific questions about particular events that
occurred during the two meetings. However, the researchers
did not show the subjects the portions of the videotape that
contained the eyewitnesses' responses to specific questions. 20
Six graduate students in psychology also served as hearsay
witnesses in the simulated hearing. The researchers showed
the hearsay witnesses the eyewitnesses' videotaped responses to
the first two series of questions.2 1 After either a one-day or a
one-week delay, the two hearsay witnesses for each eyewitness,
in turn, answered the same questions the eyewitnesses had an20. These specific questions were included so that the accuracy of the witnesses' recall could be more thoroughly assessed.
21. The graduate students were instructed to pretend they were having a
conversation with a friend who is a law clerk while they were watching the
videotape. Each of the hearsay witnesses viewed one of the eyewitnesses' responses to general questions about the two meetings. A schematic representing the pairing of eyewitnesses and hearsay witnesses during the production of
stimulus materials is presented in Figure 1. See Figure 1, infra note 22.
The hearsay witnesses were shown the eyewitnesses' responses only to
the more general questions because it would be virtually impossible for the
hearsay witnesses to have the requisite prior knowledge that would enable
them to ask about the details of the meeting unless they too had observed the
meeting.
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swered. The researchers also recorded their interrogations of
the hearsay witnesses on videotape, removed the portion of the
interrogation that consisted of specific questions, and coded the
answers in the same manner they had done for the eyewitnesses' answers.22 The responses were coded for their accuracy
in representing the actual event, not the account they heard
from the eyewitness.
Thirty-two subjects saw only a simple eyewitness's testimony.23 The remaining subjects saw a simple eyewitness and a
simple hearsay witness testify.2 Fifteen conditions resulted:
subjects in three conditions saw only an eyewitness, subjects in
six conditions saw an eyewitness paired with a hearsay witness
22. Figure 1 is a schematic representing the pairing of eyewitnesses and
hearsay witnesses during the production of stimulus materials.
Figure 1
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23. Figure 2 is a schematic representing the pairing of eyewitnesses and
hearsay witnesses in each experimental condition.
Figure 2

24. The researchers never paired testimony of a hearsay witness with the
testimony of the eyewitness who served as the declarant for that hearsay witness's testimony.

HeinOnline -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 709 1991-1992

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:703

who testified after a relatively short delay, and subjects in the
remaining six conditions viewed an eyewitness in conjunction
with a hearsay witness who testified after a relatively long
delay. 25
After watching the videotaped testimony, participants reported a verdict and indicated their confidence in that verdict.
The subjects also rated the eyewitnesses' testimony and, where
applicable, the hearsay witnesses' testimony in terms of their
confidence in the testimony's accuracy. Finally, in order to test
the participants' knowledge of the trial facts, the researchers
asked the subjects to respond to the same questions about the
26
two meetings that the witnesses had answered.
C.

EVALUATIONS OF WITNESS TESTIMONY

The researchers evaluated the mock jurors' responses to
videotaped testimony by analyzing the subjects' questionnaire
responses.27 The analysis identified the subjects' reactions to
the eyewitness and hearsay witness testimony, measured their
recall of trial facts, and distilled their primary judgments about
the case.
Researchers first averaged jurors' responses to questions
relating to eyewitness testimony. 28 The subjects' responses reflected their evaluations of the completeness of the testimony,
their confidence in the eyewitness's memory of the meetings,
the perceptiveness of the witness's observations, the quality of
the witness's memory, and the witness's confidence and effectiveness. Raters also averaged the subjects' responses reflecting
their impressions of the witness's character, including characteristics such as believability, sincerity and honesty.2 9 Raters
then created scales to measure the mock jurors' perceptions of
the eyewitness's overall accuracy of memory,3 0 the usefulness
of the eyewitness testimony, 31 the witness's motivation to dis25. See Figure 2, supra note 23.
26. The most general questions (i.e., those that merely asked respondents
to describe everything they could about the two meetings) were not used because researchers believed that subjects would provide little information in response to this type of question on a written survey.
27. Separate principal component analyses with varimax rotation were
conducted on items about the eyewitness, the hearsay witness, and the case in
general.
28. Cronbach's alpha = .9341.

29. Alpha
30. Alpha
31. Alpha

=
=
=

.7669.
.7607.
.7269.
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tort their testimony,32 and the eyewitness's likability33
Researchers also created scales to assess subjects' perceptions of the hearsay witnesses and their testimony. As with the
eyewitness testimony, researchers evaluated the testimony's
quality 34 and usefulness.as The researchers assessed perceptions of the accuracy of the witnesses' memory,36 motivation to
distort testimony,37 character,38 and likability. 39 Finally, the researchers evaluated the subjects' responses to determine
whether they felt that they received enough information to
4°
gauge the credibility, accuracy and honesty of the eyewitness
and the hearsay witness. 4 '
Raters also coded the mock jurors' answers to the recall
questions about events at the meetings to determine which
events the subjects recalled correctly, and identify the subjects'
errors of omission and commission. They asked subjects general questions about the topics discussed at the meetings, specific questions about the particular events of the meetings, and
general questions about events at the two meetings (taking into
account overlap between information provided in response to
the general and specific questions). Additionally, graduate students rated the events of the two meetings to determine their
relative importance in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.4 The researchers used the weights to create a
scale to assess the amount of information the mock jurors re43
called correctly.
32. Alpha = .6345.
33. Alpha = .6047.
34. Alpha = .9603.
35.

Alpha = .7722.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Alpha
Alpha
Alpha
Alpha
Alpha
Alpha

=
=
=
=
=
=

.7959.
.6252.
.7913.
.7030.
.8698.
.8723.

42. Weights representing the importance of each event were computed by
averaging the ratings for each item. These weights were used to compute
measures of the total number of events recalled correctly and errors of omission and commission.
43. The scale consisted of the sum of the number of events recalled correctly and a reverse coding of the number of events omitted when general and
specific questions were asked, the total number of events that were recalled
and a weighted measure of the total number of recalled events. Alpha =
.8528. Errors of commission committed when general and specific questions
were asked, the total errors of commission and the total errors of commission
weighted for the importance of the events incorrectly recalled were summed
to create a scale measuring the errors of commission made by the mock jurors'
in their recall of the evidence. Alpha = .6624.
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D. PRIMARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CASE
Researchers created three scales that measured the jurors'
evaluations of the evidence. The first of these scales reflected
the jurors' assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence provided by the eyewitness and consisted of the averaged responses to three items which ask the subject whether they have
sufficient evidence to gauge the credibility, accuracy, and honesty of the eyewitness. 4
The second scale gauged jurors' assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the hearsay witness.45 This
scale averaged responses to three items asking for judgments
about the sufficiency of the evidence in evaluating the credibility, accuracy, and honesty of the hearsay witness.
The third scale assessed the mock jurors' general satisfaction with the evidence. The scale was created by averaging responses to four items reflecting the jurors' assessment of
whether they received sufficient evidence to make a judgment,
whether the evidence they received was appropriate for the
case, whether they received all the evidence that was available,
and whether they were satisfied with the evidence that they received.4 6 Subjects also rendered a verdict and indicated their
confidence in the accuracy of their verdict.4 7 All of the scales
listed above are shown in Table 1.
IV.
A.

ACCURACY

RESULTS

OF THE WITNESSES

The study found that the eyewitness testimony's accuracy
was directly related to the length of the delay between the
observation and the recall of the events. Raters coded the eyewitnesses' responses to reflect the number of events and statements from the two meetings that the eyewitnesses correctly
recalled. They also scored the witnesses' responses to assess
the number of errors of omission and commission that the witnesses made. These scores showed that the responses to general questions provided by the witness after a one-day delay48
44. Alpha = .8698. Scale values ranged from one to nine, with higher
scores indicating greater sufficiency of the evidence.
45. Alpha = .8723.
46. Scale values range from one to nine, with higher numbers indicating
greater satisfaction with the evidence. Alpha = .8767.
47. This rating occurred on a nine-point Likert-type scale.
48. The scores after a one day delay were 30 correct, 27 omissions, and no
commissions.
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were more accurate than the testimony of witnesses who testified after a longer delay. Similarly, the responses of the witnesses who testified two days after viewing the meetings were
more accurate than the responses of witnesses who testified after a one-week delay.49 Hearsay witnesses who testified after
one day were more accurate than the hearsay witnesses who
testified after one week.50
B. EVALUATIONS OF EYEWITNESSES
The mock jurors' perceptions of the eyewitness's likability
were affected by the specific eyewitness.51 A post-hoe comparison of mean differences indicated that subjects liked a good
eyewitness better than an average eyewitness.5 2 In contrast,
eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions, eyewitnesses' witnessing condition interactions and individual
hearsay witnesses did not help explain the subjects' evaluations
of the quality of the eyewitnesses' testimony, the accuracy of
the eyewitnesses' testimony, the eyewitnesses' character, the
usefulness of the eyewitnesses' testimony or the eyewitnesses'
49. Those testifying two days after viewing scored 20 correct as opposed to
11 correct for those testifying one week after viewing;, those testifying after

two days committed 34 omissions as opposed to 46 for those testifying after one
week; and those testifying after two days committed three commissions as opposed to one for those testifying after one week.
50. Here, those testifying one day after viewing scored 13 correct as opposed to 4.67 correct for those testifying one week after viewing;, those testifying after one day committed 43 omissions as opposed to 52.67 for those
testifying after one week; and those testifying after one day committed one
commission as opposed to 1.67 for those testifying after one week.
51. F(2,159) = 3.26, p =.04. Hierarchical regressions were conducted on
the eyewitness scales with two variables coded for the three eyewitnesses
(good, average, poor) entered first, two variables coded for the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions (good, poor, none) entered second, four variables
coded for the interactions between the eyewitness and the hearsay witnessing
conditions variables were entered third and finally, six variables coded to represent the six different hearsay witnesses or the absence of a hearsay witness
were entered last. The effects of the individual hearsay witnesses on jurors'
judgments are not of theoretical interest but were entered last to see how
much variance in jurors' judgments is accounted for by individual differences
in witnesses, over and above other variables.
52. ps: good = 5.8, average = 5.27, poor = 5.6.
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motivation to distort their testimony. Table 1 summarizes differences in jurors" perceptions of the eyewitnesses. 53
C. EVALUATIONS OF HEARSAY WITNESS
Several of the mock jurors' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses were significantly affected by the quality of the hearsay
witnessing conditions, over and above contributions made by
the three eyewitnesses.5 4 For example, the jurors' evaluations
of the quality of the hearsay witness's testimony varied depend53.
Table 1
Summary of the effects of independent variables on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness and hearsay witness testimony, general trial judgments, and recall
measures*
Eyewitness

Hearsay
Witness
Conditions

Eyewitness X
Witness
Conditions

Individual
Hearsay
Witness

Quality
Accuracy

-

-

-

-

Character
Usefulness
Likeable

-

-

-

-

Motivation to

.04
-

-

-

-

Quality

-

.18

-

.14

Likeable

.07
-

.07
-

-

-

-

.05
-

-

-

Eyewitness Judgments

Distort
Hearsay Witness Judgments

Accuracy
Character
Usefulness
Motivation to
Distort

-

-

.13
.08
.14

.08
-

Evidence Judgments
Satisfaction

Sufficiency of
eyewitness

Sufficiency of

Recall/Trial facts

Errors of

-

-

hearsay
Verdict confidence
Recall Measures

-

.07
-

.10

-

.04
-

-

-

commission
Numbers in the table reprsent the change in R-squared with the addition of the
new preditors. R-squared change is reported only when it is statistically
significant at p<.05
54. Hierarchical regressions were conducted on the hearsay witness scales
with two variables coded for the three eyewitnesses (good, average, poor) entered first, one variable coded for the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions
(good, poor) entered second, two variables coded for the interactions between
the eyewitness and the hearsay conditions variables were entered third and finally, five variables coded for the six different hearsay witnesses were entered
last. Table 1, supra note 53, summarizes the differences in the jurors' ratings
of the hearsay witnesses.
*
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ing on the hearsay witnessing conditions.a The jurors perceived the quality of the testimony proffered by hearsay
witnesses one day after their initial exposure to the information as being superior to the testimony provided by the witnesses who were asked to recall the information after longer
retention intervals.ss Additionally, the quality of the hearsay
witnessing conditions affected the subjects' perceptions of the
accuracy of the hearsay witness's memory. 57 Subjects rated the
hearsay witnesses who testified under good witnessing conditions as having more accurate memories than the hearsay witnesses who testified after one week.ss
The subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' character were similarly affected by the hearsay witnessing conditions. 59 Subjects perceived that witnesses who testified after a
short interval had a better character than hearsay witnesses
who testified after a longer interval.60 Finally, the quality of
the hearsay witnessing conditions affected the usefulness of the
hearsay witnesses' testimony over and above the eyewitnesses'
contributions.61 Subjects who viewed the hearsay testimony offered after a shorter interval perceived the testimony to be
more useful than those subjects who viewed the hearsay witnesses who testified after a longer interval.6 2
The subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' testimony were affected by the individual hearsay witness.63 The
55. F(3,124) = 11.652, p < .0001.
56. t (126) = 5.31, p < .0001 (ps: good = 4.62, poor = 3.07).

57. F(3,125) = 18.702, p <.0001.

58. t (127) = 4.35, p < .0001 (Vs: good = 4.69, poor = 3.54).

59. F(3,126) = 10.947, p =.0012.
60. t (128) = 3.36, p = .001 (us: good = 6.0, poor = 5.21).
61. F(3, 126) = 22.304, p < .0001.

62. t(128) = 4.75, p < .0001 (us: good = 4.78, poor
63.

=

3.43).

Specifically, the individual hearsay witness affected the perceived

quality of the hearsay testimony. F(9,118) = 6.869, p = .0001. Subjects evaluated the hearsay witness who viewed an average eyewitness under poor hearsay witnessing conditions differently from all the other hearsay witnesses

except the witness who viewed a good eyewitness under poor hearsay witnessing conditions. In addition, the subjects' evaluations indicated that they were
able to distinguish between the "good eyewitness-poor conditions" hearsay witness and the "poor eyewitness-poor conditions," "good eyewitness-good conditions" and "poor eyewitness-good conditions" hearsay witnesses. (p < .05 (ps:
good eyewitness-good conditions = 4.76; good eyewitness-poor conditions =
2.69; average eyewitness-good conditions = 3.97; average eyewitness-poor conditions = 2.19; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 5.13; poor eyewitness-poor
conditions = 4.38)).
Moreover, the specific hearsay witness affected subjects' perceptions about
the accuracy of the hearsay witnesses' testimony. F(9,119) = 2.928, p = .0238.
Subjects rated the "average eyewitness-poor conditions" hearsay witness dif-
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quality of the hearsay witnessing conditions significantly affected jurors' perceptions of the likability of the hearsay witness.6 Subjects liked hearsay witnesses who testified under
good witnessing conditions better than hearsay witnesses who
testified under poor conditions.65
The different eyewitnesses that the hearsay witness viewed
affected mock jurors' perceptions of the likability of the hearsay witnesses.66 Hearsay witnesses who saw the good eyewitness were not liked as well as the hearsay witnesses who saw
the poor eyewitness. 67 Eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions, the combination of eyewitness with witnessing conditions, and individual hearsay witnesses did not affect
the subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' motivation to
distort their testimony. Table 1 depicts a summary of the differences in jurors' ratings of the hearsay witnesses.6 8

D. RECALL OF TRIAL FACTS
The study also indicates that the eyewitnesses contribute to
the mock jurors' ability to recall accurately the events of the
two meetings as related at the trial.6 9 Subjects who viewed the
good eyewitnesses recalled trial events more accurately than
70
the subjects who saw either of the other two eyewitnesses.
The quality of hearsay witnessing conditions also contributed,
over and above the contribution of the eyewitnesses, to the accuracy of subjects' recall of trial events. 71 However, there were
no differences between subjects who viewed hearsay witnesses
who testified following good witnessing conditions as opposed
to hearsay witnesses who testified under poor witnessing conditions. Nor did researchers identify a recall difference between
subjects who viewed the testimony of a hearsay witness and
72
those who did not.
ferently from witnesses who testified under good witnessing conditions (p <
.05), irrespective of the quality of the eyewitness's testimony that they heard.
(Its: good eyewitness-good conditions = 4.37; good eyewitness-poor conditions
= 3.52; average eyewitness-good conditions = 4.89; average eyewitness-poor
conditions = 2.92; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 4.85; poor eyewitnesspoor conditions = 4.21)
64. F(3,125) = 10.775, p =.0013.
65. t(127) = 3.29, p = .001 (lis: good = 6.29, poor = 4.49).
66. F(2,126) = 4.513, p = .0128.
67. p < .05 (ps: good=4.43, average=6.00, poor=6.32).

68.

See Table 1, supra note 53.

69.

F(2,157)
Ips: good
F(4,155)
[Ls: good

70.
71.

72.

= 5.969, p = .0032.
= 363.21, average = 330.81, poor = 325.45.
= 3.134, p = .0463.
= 353.70, poor = 331.34, none = 328.76.
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The individual hearsay witnesses significantly affected the
number of errors of commission made by the mock jurors during their recall of the events,7 3 although the eyewitnesses, the
hearsay witnessing conditions, and the interaction of the eyewitnesses and the hearsay witnessing conditions did not.7 4 Table 1 summarizes these effects.7 5
E. PRIMARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CASE
Individual eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing
conditions, interactions between eyewitness and hearsay witnessing conditions, and individual hearsay witnesses did not affect jurors' perceptions of the sufficiency of the evidence to
gauge the credibility, accuracy and honesty of the eyewitnesses
or the hearsay witnesses or their ultimate verdicts. The results
from these analyses are reported in Table 1.76
The quality of the hearsay witnessing conditions affected
mock jurors' satisfaction with the testimony that they received.77 Jurors were more satisfied with the evidence when
they viewed hearsay witnesses who testified under good conditions than when they viewed hearsay witnesses who testified
under poor conditions.78 In contrast, subjects who did not view
any hearsay testimony were no more or less satisfied with the
evidence that they received than those subjects who viewed
hearsay testimony. 79 Individual hearsay witnesses did, however, affect jurors' confidence in their verdict.80
73. F(12,147) = 2.887, p = .0245.
74. Post hoc analyses indicate that there were no significant differences
among the means (Vs: no hearsay witness = 85.43; good eyewitness-good condi-

tions = 89.75; good eyewitness-poor conditions = 71.40; average eyewitnessgood conditions = 88.80; average eyewitness-poor conditions = 74.05; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 85.06; poor eyewitness-poor conditions = 93.93).
75. See Table 1, supra note 53.
76. Id77. F(4, 157) = 3.874, p = .0228. A series of hierarchical regression analyses were also conducted on the scales that assessed jurors' satisfaction with the
evidence as well as their verdict and verdict confidence.
78. (Vs: good = 4.11, poor = 3.24, none = 4.02).
79. On the other hand, eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing
conditions, the combination of eyewitness with witnessing conditions, and individual hearsay witnesses did not help predict scale values for jurors' perceptions of the sufficiency of the evidence to gauge the credibility, accuracy, and
honesty of the hearsay witnesses or eyewitnesses.
80. F(12,147) = 4.396, p =.0022. Subjects who viewed the "good eyewitness-poor conditions" hearsay witness's testimony were significantly less confident in their verdicts than were the subjects who viewed the "poor eyewitnesspoor conditions" hearsay witness's testimony. (gs: no hearsay witness = 6.06;
good eyewitness-good conditions = 5.68; good eyewitness-poor conditions =
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COMPARISON OF EYEWITNESSES AND HEARSAY WITNESSES

The effects of the source of the testimony and the quality
of the combined testimony of the eyewitness and hearsay witness on jurors' perceptions of the eyewitnesses and the hearsay
witnesses were also of interest.8 '
Subjects' evaluations of the witnesses and their testimony
often differed depending on whether they saw an eyewitness or
a hearsay witness. Jurors rated eyewitnesses and their testimony more positively than hearsay witnesses and their testimony. Table 2 displays the means of each scale as a function
of
82
testimony source which led researchers to this conclusion.
Mock jurors' ratings of the quality of a witness's testimony
differed depending on the source of the testimony8s Subjects
felt that the quality of the eyewitness testimony was higher
than the quality of hearsay testimony.8 Additionally, subjects'
perceptions of the accuracy of a witness's testimony depended
on whether the witness experienced the event first-handa 5
Subjects rated the accuracy of eyewitnesses' testimony higher
than hearsay witnesses.8 6 Jurors' ratings of a witness's character,8 7 usefulness of a witness's testimony,8 8 and the sufficiency
of the evidence a witness provided,8 9 were also more positive
4.74; average eyewitness-good conditions = 6.15; average eyewitness-poor conditions = 5.86; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 5.76; poor eyewitness-poor
conditions = 6.63.).
81. In order to assess these effects, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
the source of the testimony as a within-subject variable and combined testimonial quality as a between-subjects factor, was conducted on jurors' ratings of
the quality of a witness's testimony, accuracy of a witness's memory, a witness's character, the usefulness of a witness's testimony, the likableness of a
witness, the sufficiency of the evidence provided by a witness and a witness's
motivation to distort his/her testimony. Because the experimental design employed in this study was not a fully crossed factorial design, a repeated measures ANOVA could not be conducted on the entire data set. Only those cells
in which subjects viewed a good or poor eyewitness, and a hearsay witness who
testified to the account given by a good or poor eyewitness were included in
the analyses.
82. See Table 2, infra note 90.
83. F(1,37) = 11.28, p = .002.
84. [ts: eyewitness = 5.27, hearsay witness = 4.05.
85. F(1,39) = 21.72, p < .001.
86. ps: eyewitness = 5.36, hearsay witness = 4.19.
87. F(1,39) = 12.51, p = .001 (s: eyewitness = 6.59, hearsay witness =
5.63).
88. F(1,38) = 79.79, p < .001 ([ts: eyewitness = 6.42, hearsay witness =
4.0).
89. F(1,39) = 11.55, p = .002 (ps: eyewitness = 4.19, hearsay witness =
3.47).
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for eyewitnesses than hearsay witnesses'
The overall quality of the testimony received, and the interaction of the source and combined testimonial quality had no
significant effects on jurors' perceptions of the witnesses and
their testimony. Finally, jurors' perceptions of a witness's motivation to distort their testimony in favor of the prosecution or
the defense were not significantly different as a function of the
source of the testimony.
V. DISCUSSION
The present study extends previous findings that juries
rely more heavily on eyewitness testimony than hearsay testimony.91 Jurors' evaluations of the quality of the witness's testimony, the accuracy and the usefulness of that testimony, the
character of the witness and the sufficiency of the evidence provided by that witness suggest that jurors are more skeptical of
the value and reliability of hearsay testimony than of eyewitness testimony.
This study also replicates previously documented findings
that subjects cannot differentiate between good eyewitnesses
and poor eyewitnesses.92 Even though subjects viewed eyewitness testimony that differed objectively in accuracy their ratings of the eyewitness testimony's quality, accuracy and
usefulness did not differ. More interestingly, this study sug90.
Table 2
Summary of the scale means as a function of the source of testimony
Eyewitness

Hearsay witness

Quality*

5.27

4.05

Accuracy*

5.36

4.19

Character**
Usefulness*
Likeable

6.59
5.67
5.67

5.63
5.91
5.91

Motivation to Distort
3.85
3.37
Evidence Sufficiency*
4.19
3.47
* indicates that means are significantly different at p.:_.002.
91. See, e.g., Miene et al., supra note 14.
92. See generally Lindsay et al., Test of Metamemory Hypotheses, supra
note 18 (illustrating that poor witnessing conditions failed to significantly influence jurors' evaluations of an eyewitness); Wells & Leippe, Memoryfor Peripheral Detail, supra note 18 (suggesting that jurors' reliance on
eyewitnesses' memories of peripheral detail leads to inaccurate perceptions of
accuracy); Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Testimony, supra note
18 (reviewing recent research concluding that jurors are overly willing to believe in the accuracy of eyewitness testimony); Cutler et al., supra note 18
(concluding that lay people are insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness

testimony).
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gests that people are sensitive to the quality and accuracy of
hearsay testimony. Subjects in this study were sensitive to the
differences in accuracy of hearsay testimony despite not being
informed about the differences in witnessing conditions for the
hearsay witnesses.
This study's data do not address issues of process, but it is
conceivable that jurors scrutinize hearsay testimony more rigorously than eyewitness testimony because they distrust hearsay testimony inherently. The findings that jurors are
insensitive to the quality of eyewitness testimony, yet are sensitive to the relative accuracy of hearsay evidence, challenge the
legal assumption that jurors can accurately judge the validity of
eyewitness testimony but are incapable of judging the reliability of hearsay testimony.
Finally, Landsman and Rakos hypothesize that even if jurors can accurately assess the quality of a hearsay witness's testimony, courts should restrict hearsay evidence at trial because
the trial participants may question the legal proceeding's fair93
ness if the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.
Psychological research further suggests that if participants perceive trial proceedings to be unfair, they will not be satisfied
that justice has been served.9 This study's results suggest that
this concern may be unwarranted. The jurors' satisfaction with
the evidence did not differ between jurors who saw hearsay testimony offered under good witnessing conditions and jurors
who saw only the testimony of an eyewitness. Jurors were less
satisfied with the evidence when they heard the hearsay testimony offered under poor witnessing conditions. This decrease
in the level of juror satisfaction, however, appears to be linked
to the inadequacy of the hearsay evidence presented in these
conditions. If decreased satisfaction in the evidence was the result of the introduction of any hearsay testimony, irrespective
of its quality, one would expect to see a decrease in juror satisfaction whenever they are exposed to hearsay evidence. This
pattern of results did not emerge. This study therefore addresses the question raised by Landsman and Rakos about
whether jurors' perceptions of procedural fairness are adversely affected by the introduction of hearsay evidence. 95
93.

Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 79-80.

94. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIs 73-76 (1975) (concluding that mock jurors are more satisfied with an adversarial procedure than a inquisitory procedure in part
because they perceive it to be more fair).
95. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 79-80.
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There are several limitations on the external validity of the
research reported herein. First, the eyewitness and hearsay evidence were not presented in the context of a full trial. However, to the extent that the hearsay evidence is more salient in
our study than it might be in the context of a full trial, jurors
would probably give more weight to the hearsay testimony in
the absence of other evidence. To the contrary, jurors consistently evaluated hearsay testimony more negatively than eyewitness testimony. Additionally, the salience of the hearsay
testimony in this study should provide a strong test of the proposition that the introduction of hearsay evidence will reduce
satisfaction with the trial proceedings. In fact, this study's findings indicate that jurors' satisfaction with the trial evidence decreased with the introduction of hearsay evidence only when
that evidence was of poor quality.
Second, attorneys did not subject the eyewitness or the
hearsay witness to rigorous cross-examination. Although legal
scholars' objections to the admissibility of hearsay have often
rested on the inability of the attorney to cross-examine the declarant and the relative ineffectiveness of the cross-examination of a hearsay witness, 96 subjects in this study were skeptical
of hearsay testimony despite the absence of cross-examination.
If attorneys had cross-examined the hearsay witness, that interrogation should decrease jurors' evaluations of the usefulness
and quality of the hearsay testimony. Further research should
examine whether an opponent's cross-examination may further
improve jurors' abilities to determine the probative value of
hearsay evidence. 97
An additional limitation of this study is the absence of the
cautionary instructions that often accompany hearsay testimony. Were hearsay freely admitted, judges would provide jurors with cautionary instructions about the unreliability of
hearsay testimony. These cautionary instructions would be
designed to make jurors more skeptical of hearsay testimony.
Despite the lack of instructions, jurors in our study were already skeptical of hearsay testimony. The addition of cautionary instructions should increase the difference in jurors'
perceptions of the quality and usefulness of eyewitness and
hearsay testimony. Finally, this study did not contain all as. 96. Park, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing the advantages provided by crossexamination of a declarant and the disadvantages of being unable to cross-examine hearsay declarants).
97. See, e.g., Cutler et al., supra note 18 (concluding that lay people are
insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness testimony).
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pects of a realistic trial simulation. Nonetheless, the missing
trial components would have further reduced the jurors' reliance on hearsay testimony and, therefore, pose little threat to
the validity of our findings.
This Article addresses only one of many issues underlying
calls for hearsay reform. For example, this Article does not address whether the exclusion of hearsay evidence produces beneficial effects in some police investigation techniques. Nor does
it address the juror's ability to evaluate hearsay over the entire
spectrum of criminal and civil issues. The jurors' evaluation of
hearsay might differ, for example, in a case with a great deal of
emotional appeal.
Nevertheless, this study's results suggest that, in general,
jurors are skeptical of the quality and usefulness of hearsay testimony. More specifically, jurors in this study were able to differentiate among accurate and inaccurate hearsay witnesses. In
contrast, jurors in this and other studies failed to make similar
distinctions among eyewitnesses. This research further suggests that jurors' satisfaction with the evidence and the trial
proceedings is not diminished with the admission of hearsay evidence of good quality. These findings provide some empirical
support for the notion that the legal system should provide jurors with any information that may assist them in resolving the
case, including hearsay evidence.
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